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Gamblers’ cognitive distortions are thought to be an important mechanism involved
in the development and maintenance of problem gambling. The Gambling Cognitions
Inventory (GCI) evaluates two categories of distortions: beliefs that one is lucky
(i.e., “Luck/Chance”) and beliefs that one has special gambling-related skills (i.e.,
“Skill/Attitude”). Prior psychometric evaluations of the GCI demonstrated the utility of
both subscales as measures of distortions and their concurrent relations to gambling
problems among Canadian gamblers. However, these associations have not yet been
studied in gamblers from other cultures nor have relationships between the GCI and
indices of gambling behavior been investigated. In addition, the predictive validity of the
GCI scales have not been evaluated in studies to date. The present study investigated
the validity of the GCI as a measure of cognitive distortions in a sample of 49 Dutch
gamblers by examining its concurrent and prospective relationships to both gambling
problems (as measured through a standardized nine-item questionnaire assessing
gambling-related problems) and behaviors (as measured through two variables: days
spent gambling and time spent gambling in minutes) at baseline and over 1-month
and 6-month intervals. The GCI subscales were internally consistent at all timepoints,
and moderately to strongly inter-correlated at all timepoints. Each subscale correlated
with an independent dimension of gambling both concurrently and prospectively:
Luck/Chance was related to greater gambling problems and Skill/Attitude was related to
greater gambling behavior. Thus, the two GCI subscales, while inter-correlated, appear
to be related to different gambling outcomes, at least among Dutch gamblers. Moreover,
the first evidence of the predictive validity of the GCI scales was demonstrated over a 1-
month and 6-month interval. It is recommended that both types of cognitive distortions
be considered in research and clinical practice to fully understand and address individual
risk for excessive and problematic gambling.
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INTRODUCTION
Problem gambling is an important public health concern in many
countries. In North America, 3.8% of individuals will experience
symptoms of problem gambling within their lifetime, while
1.8% will exhibit more severe symptoms of past year gambling
disorder (Jacques et al., 2000). Specifically in Canada and the
United States, past year prevalence rates of problem gambling
averaged 1.8 and 3.2%, respectively (Williams et al., 2012). Those
in European countries experience similar levels of gambling
problems to those in North America, with 2.0–3.5% exhibiting
symptoms of problem gambling and 1.2–3.2% displaying more
severe symptoms of a gambling disorder (Becona, 1996). Past
year gambling rates differ between European countries, however,
ranging from 0.5% in Netherlands and Denmark to 2.8% in
Belgium (Williams et al., 2012). Gambling often results in
financial losses for gamblers. In Canada, for example, the
industry acquires a yearly average of approximately $237 per
capita compared to $372 per capita in the United States and
€51.76 per capita in Netherlands (Global Betting and Gaming
Consultants, 2002). In addition to financial losses, disordered
gambling creates adverse familial, societal, and psychological
consequences. Such consequences underscore the importance of
further investigation into its underlying mechanisms. Though
many hypothesized pathways to a gambling problem exist,
cognitive distortions are thought to be an important mechanism
involved in the development and maintenance of problem and
disordered gambling (Ladouceur and Walker, 1996).
Cognitive Distortions
Gambling-related cognitive distortions are central to the
cognitive theory of gambling disorder. The cognitive theory
of gambling disorder posits that cognitive distortions, also
referred to as erroneous beliefs or fallacies, are involved in
the development of, and serve to maintain, problem gambling
(Ladouceur and Walker, 1996; Ladouceur, 2004). Broadly, these
cognitive distortions are a set of false or exaggerated underlying
beliefs that influence the automatic thoughts and behaviors
a gambler experiences or displays during a gambling session
(Ladouceur and Walker, 1996). These beliefs are thought to arise
from the gambler’s misperception of randomness, prompting
the individual to believe he or she can exert control over
and correctly predict the outcome of a chance-determined
game. Motivated by the opportunity for monetary gain, the
gambler’s cognitive distortions prompt strategizing around the
development of his or her gambling-related skill in an attempt
to increase the likelihood of winning. The cognitive theory of
problem gambling emphasizes that these faulty beliefs perpetuate
gambling disorder by impacting the gambler’s understanding
of randomness, perceived control over the game, attributions
of skill, motives for continued engagement in gambling, and
perceived reasons for gambling losses (Breen et al., 2001).
The Gambling Cognitions Inventory
In a Canadian study, Holub (2003) developed a 40-item measure
of gambling-related cognitive distortions called the Gambling
Cognitions Inventory (GCI). McInnes et al. (2014) validated
the GCI as a measure of gambling-related cognitive distortions
in four different samples of Canadian problem and disordered
gamblers. Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed a two-factor
structure–beliefs one has special gambling-related skills (i.e.,
Skill/Attitude factor) and beliefs one is lucky (i.e., Luck/Chance
factor). Each factor exhibited good internal reliability, with
alphas ranging from 0.86 to 0.92 for the Skill/Attitude subscale
and 0.83 to 0.90 for the Luck/Chance subscale. Moreover, the
GCI showed good convergent validity with other measures of
gambling distortions and with measures of gambling problems.
noted the two factors of the GCI closely mimic two of the
most commonly studied fallacies in the gambling literature, the
Illusion of Control (i.e., belief that one can control the outcome
of a chance-determined game; Langer, 1975) for Skill/Attitude
and the Gambler’s Fallacy (i.e., belief that frequent losses will be
followed by an imminent win; Toneatto, 1999) for Luck/Chance.
Moreover, McInnes et al. (2014) note the GCI is unlike other
measures of distortions in one important respect. As opposed
to other measures of gambling-related cognitive distortions,
which often assess both gambling-related distortions and other
types of gambling-related cognitions, the GCI specifically assesses
gambling-related cognitive distortions. For example, along with
assessing gambling-related cognitive distortions, the Gambling
Related Cognitions Scale also measures gambling expectancies
(e.g., “gambling makes things seem better”) and the gambler’s
perceived capacity to stop gambling (e.g., “I can’t function
without gambling”; Raylu and Oei, 2004a, p. 768).
The Importance of Examining Gambling
Problems and Gambling Behaviors
In their study, McInnes et al. (2014) found both types of cognitive
distortions (i.e., Luck/Chance and Skill/Attitude), as indexed by
the GCI scales, were related to severity of gambling problems.
However, akin to other addictive behaviors, the importance of
examining both problems and behaviors as distinct outcomes has
been well established. Sadava (1985) found alcohol consumption
behavior and alcohol-related problems were only moderately
correlated constructs (r’s = 0.08–0.50), suggesting behaviors
and problems are overlapping yet unique alcohol outcome
dimensions. Moreover, certain variables independently relate to
alcohol use behaviors and alcohol-related problems. For example,
Stewart et al. (2006) found social anxiety (i.e., an intense fear
of embarrassment or negative evaluation in social situations
resulting in an avoidance of such situations; American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) was positively related to drinking problems, yet
negatively related to drinking behavior. In other words, socially
anxious individuals seldom drink but when they do drink,
they are likely to experience alcohol-related problems (Stewart
et al., 2006). This finding demonstrates that drinking problems
and drinking behavior are distinct and should be studied as
such.
Like alcohol, disordered gambling is best understood by
examining the underlying gambling behaviors that engender
gambling problems (Walker et al., 2006). Examining gambling
behaviors is relevant to understanding disordered gambling—
targeting gambling behaviors in treatment often resolves
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gambling problems. Akin to the alcohol literature, though
inextricably linked, gambling behaviors (e.g., gambling
frequency, time spent gambling, money spent gambling)
and gambling-related problems (i.e., negative outcomes from
gambling such as financial and relationship problems) are
moderately, but not highly, inter-correlated (r’s = 0.34–0.61;
Joukhador et al., 2004; Fischer and Smith, 2008; Flack and
Morris, 2015). Although these two dimensions of gambling show
some overlap, they are distinct, thus meriting an independent
investigation of each dimension to fully comprehend the
nature of disordered gambling. For example, Fischer and
Smith (2008) examined the differential relationship of several
impulsivity-related constructs to gambling behavior and
gambling problems. The impulsivity constructs examined
included “urgency” (i.e., the propensity to behave impulsively
when upset) and “sensation seeking” (i.e., the propensity to
pursue experiences that are novel or stimulating; Whiteside and
Lynam, 2001). Although gambling behavior (as measured by
gambling frequency) and gambling problems [as measured by
the South Oakes Gambling Screen (SOGS); Lesieur and Blume,
1987] were moderately inter-correlated (r = 0.34), urgency
was positively correlated solely with gambling problems while
sensation seeking was positively correlated solely with gambling
behavior. Evidently, examining either gambling problems or
gambling behaviors alone does not paint a complete picture of
disordered gambling. Given these findings, it is important to
include measures of gambling behavior in addition to measures
of gambling problems as outcome variables when examining
the validity of any measure of gambling-related cognitive
distortions.
Cognitive Distortions and Gambling Problems
Gambling-related cognitive distortions have been consistently
found to be related to gambling problems. Previous literature
has found a positive relationship between gambling-related
cognitive distortions and problem gambling severity, where
those with a greater severity of gambling problems endorse
significantly more cognitive distortions compared to those with
less severe gambling problems (Cunningham et al., 2014). For
example, disordered gamblers and problem gamblers endorse
considerably more cognitive distortions compared to both
non-problem and social gamblers (Toneatto, 1999; Joukhador
et al., 2004; Myrseth et al., 2010), even after controlling for
genetic and environmental factors (Xian et al., 2009). While
it is evident that gambling-related cognitive distortions and
gambling problems are related, far less research examines the
relation of gambling-related cognitive distortions to gambling
behaviors.
Cognitive Distortions and Gambling Behaviors
A few studies have established a relationship between gambling-
related cognitive distortions and gambling behaviors. In a sample
of machine gamblers, for example, Joukhador et al. (2004) found
those with greater superstitious beliefs around gambling spent
more time gambling and engaged in more gambling sessions
each week compared to those with less superstitious beliefs.
Using data from five gambling prevalence studies, Miller and
Currie (2008) examined the relationship between gambling-
related cognitive distortions and risky gambling behaviors (i.e.,
borrowing money to gamble, returning to gamble to recoup prior
losses, and betting more money than one can afford) in 11,652
Canadian gamblers. They found that gambling-related cognitive
distortions and risky gambling behaviors were positively related.
Specifically, those who endorsed a higher degree of gambling-
related cognitive distortions engaged in significantly more risky
gambling behaviors than those who endorsed a lesser degree of
cognitive distortions. Yakovenko et al. (2016) sought to assess
the temporal directionality of the relationship between cognitive
distortions and gambling behaviors (i.e., gambling frequency,
money spent, number of games played). They recruited 1,372
participants with varying degrees of gambling severity (i.e., 1,288
non-gamblers, 43 low-risk gamblers, 41 disordered gamblers) and
found distortions, as indexed by the Gambling Fallacies Scale
(Williams, 2003, Unpublished), predicted increases in gambling
behaviors over time. In sum, to understand how cognitive
distortions contribute to the development and maintenance of
disordered gambling, we must elucidate their relationship to both
gambling problems and gambling behaviors.
Cultural Differences in Gambling
Distortions
While these studies further our understanding of the role
of cognitive distortions in gambling-related problems
and behaviors, this body of empirical research has been
predominantly performed with North American samples (Raylu
and Oei, 2004b). Varying values and beliefs across cultures may
be reflected in varying gambling-related cognitive distortions
across cultures, in turn contributing to cultural differences in
gambling behaviors and levels of gambling problems (Raylu and
Oei, 2004b).
Gambling is defined differently across cultures (Dickins and
Thomas, 2016). In their review of the literature, Dickins and
Thomas (2016) note that the definition of gambling is molded by
the collective attitude, acquired through cultural customs. These
alternative definitions of gambling result in certain gambling
practices being viewed as acceptable in some cultures yet
unacceptable in others. Accompanying these cultural beliefs are
various risk and protective factors that help prompt or protect
against disordered gambling, with these influences potentially
varying across cultures (Oei and Goh, 2015). For example, self-
perceived resilience has been linked to greater gambling problems
among Chinese gamblers who endorse greater gambling-related
cognitive distortions (Oei and Goh, 2015) yet less severe
gambling problems in Canadian gamblers (Lussier et al., 2007).
It has been speculated that cultural beliefs which favor gambling,
such as those based on superstition, fate, luck, and chance, might
contribute to cross-cultural differences in disordered gambling
by means of encouraging and normalizing gambling involvement
(Raylu and Oei, 2004b; Papineau, 2005; Oei and Goh, 2015).
While beliefs in luck and chance are present in most cultures,
some cultures hold more profound beliefs in superstition, fate,
luck, and chance, which are presumably derived from cultural
customs such as religion (Dickins and Thomas, 2016). Among
other things, these beliefs are thought to extend to a given
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culture’s gambling practices (Raylu and Oei, 2004b; Papineau,
2005).
Members of the Chinese culture have shown profound beliefs
in superstition, fate, luck, and chance (Raylu and Oei, 2004b;
Papineau, 2005). Lam (2007) performed a naturalistic study
which involved observing the gambling behaviors of Chinese
baccarat players at a casino in Macau. He reported witnessing
high levels of the illusion of control, inferred when players were
observed shouting out specific words or phrases in hopes of
influencing the chance of obtaining a smaller or larger numbered
card. Ohtsuka and Chan (2010) examined the superstitious beliefs
of Chinese problem and non-problem mahjong gamblers using
self-report questionnaires. Although both gambler types reported
superstitious beliefs, problem gamblers endorsed significantly
more cognitive distortions regarding mahjong than non-problem
gamblers. Compared to cultures in which beliefs in luck and
chance are not as profound, members of the Chinese culture
have shown greater beliefs specifically in the illusion of control
compared to those of Caucasian decent (Oei et al., 2008).
However, this is not always the case, and while superstitious
beliefs can differ between cultures, certain beliefs may also be
shared. For example, American and Chinese gamblers have been
found to hold similarly strong superstitious beliefs regarding
gambling rituals compared to Japanese and Korean gamblers,
who do not tend to endorse this type of superstitious thinking
(Kim et al., 2016).
Additional evidence of cultural differences in disordered
gambling comes from differing prevalence rates of problem
gambling between cultures. Differences in prevalence rates of
disordered gambling are observed for many cultures, but also
among those where beliefs in superstition, fate, luck, and chance
are not as insidious and profound. In Netherlands, although 87%
of individuals have reported gambling in their lifetime, only a
small proportion exhibit gambling-related problems (De Bruin
et al., 2006, as cited in Goudriaan et al., 2009). Approximately
1.0% of individuals 16 years of age and older are considered
to have a lifetime gambling disorder in Netherlands; yearly
prevalence rates of problem gambling are approximately 0.5%.
This is similar to past year disordered gambling rates in nearby
European countries such as Denmark (0.5%) yet comparatively
lower than past year disordered gambling rates in Canada
(1.2–2.2%) and the United States (1.7–4.6%; Williams et al.,
2012).
While cultural customs and traditions may influence gambling
practices, additional variables to be considered are the structural
barriers imposed by laws which limit accessibility to gambling
activities (Jacques et al., 2000; Raylu and Oei, 2004b). Different
gambling laws and regulations within a particular culture may
impact an individual’s values and beliefs around gambling
(Raylu and Oei, 2004b). Certain gambling-related policies in
Netherlands may contribute to the relatively lower disordered
gambling rate compared to other countries such as Canada and
the United States (De Bruin et al., 2001, as cited in Goudriaan
et al., 2009). Since the year 2000 when stricter gambling laws
were imposed, the number of slot machines in Netherlands
has decreased. A primary goal from these more restrictive laws
was to reduce “automatic,” persistent gambling behavior (De
Bruin et al., 2001, as cited in Goudriaan et al., 2009, p. 191).
As a part of these regulations, slot machines not currently
in use were no longer permitted to display flashing lights or
sounds, limiting their appeal to the potential user. Slot machines
were no longer permitted in certain types of entertainment
establishments such as bowling alleys and sports clubs, but
continued to be allowed in pubs and restaurants, with these latter
establishments limited to two slot machines each. Employees
at gambling establishments received education on disordered
gambling, including how to approach those who appeared to have
a gambling problem or displayed problematic gambling behavior.
Moreover, gamblers could voluntarily prohibit their own entry
into certain gambling establishments (De Bruin et al., 2001, as
cited in Goudriaan et al., 2009). However, the strict policies in
2000 do not necessarily apply to online gambling, which has
become increasingly popular, forcing the privatization of the
gambling industry and the liberalization of the gambling market
since 2002 (Kingma, 2008).
Thus, while many individuals in Netherlands engage in
gambling, a relatively lower proportion develop gambling
problems relative to those in many other parts of Europe and
in North America (De Bruin et al., 2006, as cited in Goudriaan
et al., 2009). It is curious whether established risk factors such
as cognitive distortions operate similarly in Dutch culture as in
North America, where rates of problem gambling are relatively
higher. However, it is difficult to assess whether certain gambling
policies, such as those in Netherlands, create cross-cultural
differences in gambling-related cognitive distortions. This is
because many instruments assessing gambling-related cognitions
are developed with, and validated on, North American gamblers.
This calls into question the ability to generalize findings with
these existing cognitive distortion measures to other cultures
where values and beliefs may differ from those of mainstream
North America.
The Present Study
While the GCI has been validated in a large sample of
Canadian gamblers, it has yet to be validated as a measure of
distortions in other cultures. Further, while the relationship of
the GCI subscales to gambling problems has been demonstrated
(McInnes et al., 2014), the relation of GCI distortions to
gambling behaviors has yet to be established. Additionally,
the predictive validity of the GCI has yet to be determined.
Thus, the purposes of the present study were to examine the
concurrent and prospective relationships of the GCI scales to
gambling behaviors and problems at baseline and over 1-month
and 6-month follow-ups in a sample of Dutch gamblers. It
was hypothesized that both Luck/Chance and Skill/Attitude
distortions would be concurrently positively associated with both
gambling behaviors and gambling-related problems. Moreover, it
was hypothesized that baseline values on these two GCI subscales
would be positively associated with gambling-related behaviors
and problems 1-month and 6-months later. Findings different
than those observed in North American gamblers (McInnes
et al., 2014) in a sample of Dutch gamblers could broaden our
understanding of the impact of cultural beliefs on gambling
behavior and problems and elucidate whether established risk
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Participants were community-recruited through online gambling
forums1,2, social media sites (i.e., Facebook and Twitter) and
advertisements placed throughout the city of Amsterdam. To
be eligible, participants were required to be 18 years of age
or older, not attempting to abstain from gambling, and have
gambled online or at a casino at least three times in the past
2 months (not including lottery tickets). Moreover, respondents
were required to complete the study from distinct IP addresses
to be eligible. This was to help eliminate any opportunities
for fraud (i.e., a single participant completing the study more
than once). Fifty-three participants were originally recruited.
Four participants were excluded, one due to unfulfilled inclusion
criteria and three due to repeat IP address issues and concerns
about potential fraudulent data. The final sample was composed
of 49 participants (all male) at baseline, 46 at the 1-month follow-
up, and 41 at the 6-month follow-up (see Table 1 for distribution
of gambling risk). Our sample was primarily composed of
low to moderate risk gamblers (see Table 1). At baseline, one
participant completed only week one of the Gambling Timeline
Followback (G-TLFB; Sobell and Sobell, 1992; Weinstock et al.,
2004) and thus, this participant’s data was considered incomplete
at this timepoint. Additionally, one participant solely entered
data for the days in which they gambled at baseline but no
other variable. Thus, for the G-TLFB at baseline, 48 participants
have complete data for days gambled and 47 have complete
data for time spent gambling. At the 1-month follow-up, two
participants failed to complete the GCI and thus for this
measure, there were 44 participants. At baseline, participants
ranged in age from 20 to 59 years old (M = 30.8, SD = 9.0).
Once eligible, participants completed Dutch translations of the
following questionnaires: the Problem Gambling Severity Index
(PGSI) of the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI; Ferris
and Wynne, 2001; McCready and Adlaf, 2006) which assessed
level of gambling problems, the GCI (Holub, 2003; McInnes
et al., 2014) to assess gambling-related cognitive distortions,
the 30-day G-TLFB (Sobell and Sobell, 1992; Weinstock et al.,
2004) to assess gambling behavior, and the first question of
the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur and Blume,
1http://Voetbalweddenschappen.com
2http://onlinegokforum.nl




Dutch translations of the SOGS and PGSI were used in
the present study. The GCI was translated from English
to Dutch and then back-translated from Dutch to English
by two independent research associates. The first individual
was a native Dutch speaker who was fluent in English
and familiar with the contents of the GCI and the second
individual was a native (American) English speaker who was
also fluent in Dutch. The comparison of the back-translated
version of the GCI to the original English version was
acceptable and required only minor revisions in phrasing.
A research associate also translated the G-TLFB from English
to Dutch. The G-TLFB did not require any back-translation
procedure as it is very simple and explicitly asks specific
questions.
Severity of Gambling-Related Problems
The PGSI of the CPGI was administered to determine
participant’s severity of gambling problems. This measure is
composed of nine items (e.g., “How often have you bet more
than you could really afford to lose?”; “How often has your
gambling caused you any health problems, including stress or
anxiety?”). Each question is rated on a 4-point Likert scale with
responses being 0 (never), 1 (sometimes), 2 (most of the time),
and 3 (almost always). All nine items are summed with higher
scores indicating greater gambling-related problems (Currie
et al., 2013). This summed score creates four categories of
gambling-related risk: non-problem gambling (score of 0), low
levels of gambling problems (score of 1 or 2), moderate levels
of gambling problems (score of 3–7), and problem gambling
(score of 8 or more; Ferris and Wynne, 2001). The PGSI
has demonstrated good internal consistency (α = 0.84; Ferris
and Wynne, 2001) and test–retest reliability over a 3- to 4-
week period (r = 0.78). It has also shown good convergent
validity with the SOGS and DSM-IV criteria for pathological
gambling (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Ferris and
Wynne, 2001). In the present study, the PGSI demonstrated
acceptable internal consistency at baseline (α = 0.74) and 6-
months (α = 0.74), and marginally acceptable internal consistency
at 1-month (α = 0.66). Moreover, it demonstrated good test–
retest reliability over 1-month [r(46) = 0.73, p < 0.001]
and 6-months [r(41) = 0.65; p < 0.001] in the present
study.
TABLE 1 | Distribution of gambling risk across baseline (T1), 1-month (T2), and 6-months (T3).
Non-problem gambler Low levels of problems Moderate levels of problems Problem gambler
n % n % n % n %
T1 8 16.3 18 36.7 18 36.7 5 10.2
T2 9 19.6 14 30.4 21 45.7 2 4.3
T3 9 22.0 16 39.0 13 31.7 3 7.3
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Gambling-Related Cognitive Distortions
The original GCI is a 40-item measure that assesses gambling-
related cognitive distortions regarding Luck/Chance and
Skill/Attitude (Holub, 2003; McInnes et al., 2014). Each item is
rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree)
to 4 (strongly disagree). Items were reverse scored so that higher
scores indicate higher levels of given cognitive distortions. In
the present study, we administered the 40-item version but
scored the measure based on the refined 33-item version which is
embedded within the original (McInnes et al., 2014). The refined
version has 14 items for the Luck/Chance subscale and 19 items
for the Skill/Attitude subscale. An example of a question related
to Luck/Chance cognitive distortions is: “I can tell when I am
lucky or am having a lucky day, and that is a good day to gamble.”
An example of a question assessing cognitive distortions related
to Skill/Attitude is: “I can analyze my wins to give me strategies
to make me a better gambler.” To score the subscales of the
33-item GCI, items are first converted from a 1–4 to a 0–3 scale;
then items pertaining to each subscale are summed and divided
by the maximal possible summed score to obtain a score between
0 and 1. A score closer to 1 indicates greater cognitive distortions
while a score closer to 0 indicates less cognitive distortions. To
score the Luck/Chance subscale, each of the relevant 14 items
were summed; this sum was then divided by 42 (the maximum
possible Luck/Chance sum). To score the Skill/Attitude subscale,
each of the 19 items was summed; this sum was then divided by
57 (the maximum possible Skill/Attitude sum). The Luck/Chance
and Skill/Attitude subscales have shown marginally acceptable
to good internal reliability (α = 0.67–0.87) and good concurrent
validity with the SOGS (r’s = 0.41–0.43) and PGSI in Canadian
samples (r’s = 0.25–0.36; significant at p < 0.05; McInnes et al.,
2014).
Gambling Behavior
The G-TLFB is a 30-day retrospective calendar that asks
participants to reflect upon and report various gambling-related
behaviors they have engaged in during the past month. The
present study looked specifically at the following behaviors:
number of days gambled and time spent gambling. Initially,
money risked gambling was included as an outcome measure.
However, this measure was poorly correlated, and often not
correlated, with itself and the other G-TLFB items and thus
was not included in the present study. Anecdotally, participants
find money risked a hard concept to understand and the
person administering the measure often needs to explain, with
examples, what is meant by money risked. It is possible that in
the online format, participants interpreted this item differently
and this added measurement error and obscured any expected
relations.
Participants were instructed to enter data on their gambling
behavior for each day that they gambled. The G-TLFB exhibits
good test–retest reliability over a 2-week period (r’s = 0.74–0.96)
and good concurrent validity with the SOGS (r’s = 0.30–0.32;
Lesieur and Blume, 1987; Weinstock et al., 2004). In the
present study, days spent gambling showed good test–retest
reliability over 1-month [r(46) = 0.57; p < 0.001] and 6-months
[r(41) = 0.43; p = 0.003]. As well, time spent gambling showed
good test–retest reliability over 1-month [r(45) = 0.72; p < 0.001]
and 6-months [r(41) = 0.36; p = 0.010].
Frequency of Games Played
The first question of the SOGS was used for sample description
purposes to assess the frequency with which participants engaged
in certain types of gambling (Lesieur and Blume, 1987).
Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they have
partaken in particular forms of gambling in their lifetime, with
responses being “not at all,” “less than once a week,” and “once a
week or more.”
Statistical Analysis
Pearson product moment correlations and Spearman’s Rank
correlations were performed in IBM SPSS Statistics (version 22)
between the GCI subscales (i.e., Luck/Chance and Skill/Attitude)
and gambling problem and behavior indices from the PGSI
and G-TLFB, respectively. Pearson’s correlations were followed
with a test of differences in dependent correlations using
Steiger’s Z-test of parametric correlations. One-tailed tests
were used, as directional predictions had been made a priori.
Internal consistency estimates for each GCI subscale were also
performed in SPSS by calculating Cronbach’s alpha. Cohen’s
(1992) conventions were used to judge the magnitude of effect
sizes for the correlations and the differences between correlations
in the present study. Cohen’s conventions are as follows: small
(0.10 < r < 0.30); medium (0.30 < r < 0.50); large (r < 0.50).
Procedure
The present study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the University of Amsterdam and the
Dalhousie University Research Ethics Boards with informed
consent from all subjects. The protocol was approved by the
University of Amsterdam and the Dalhousie University Research
Ethics Boards. The participants completed the screening,
informed consent, questionnaires, and debriefing online in
their homes. Interested participants clicked on the link to the
study website displayed on banners and advertisements. This
link directed the participant to the study website where they
created an account and completed eligibility screening. Once
deemed eligible, participants were directed to a page detailing
informed consent. As the study was performed online, informed
consent involved checking boxes for statements that detailed
the informed consent. Checking these boxes indicated that the
participant understood each statement and that they made an
informed decision to participate. All participants gave informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Once
the participant consented, they were invited to begin the study.
The following questionnaires were administered at baseline: a
demographics questionnaire, the PGSI of the CPGI, the GCI,
the G-TLFB, and the first question of the SOGS for descriptive
purposes. The following questionnaires were administered at the
1-month and 6-month follow-up: the PGSI of the CPGI, the
GCI, and the G-TLFB. Each session (baseline, 1-month follow-
up, and 6-month follow-up) lasted approximately 25 min and
following its completion, the participant received a claim code for
a €17.80 (∼$25.00 Canadian) Bol.com vouchers as remuneration.
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Means, standard deviations, and ranges for measures of gambling
problems, gambling behaviors (i.e., days spent gambling and
time spent gambling in minutes), and gambling-related cognitive
distortions (i.e., Luck/Chance and Skill/Attitude distortions) are
available in Table 2. Values provided for the GCI subscales are
based on the 0–1 rescaling of the measure.
In the present study, frequent playing of skills games (e.g.,
cards) was much more common than frequent playing of chance
games (e.g., 98% played cards versus 14% played slot machines
once a week or more), as indexed by the first item of the
SOGS.
Psychometric Properties of the
Gambling Cognitions Inventory
The Skill/Attitude and Luck/Chance subscale were moderately
inter-correlated at baseline [r(49) = 0.56, p < 0.001] and
6-months [r(41) = 0.57, p < 0.001] and strongly inter-
correlated at 1-month [r(44) = 0.67, p < 0.001]. The
Skill/Attitude and Luck/Chance subscales also demonstrated
good to excellent internal consistency at baseline (α’s = 0.90 and
0.87, respectively), 1-month (α’s = 0.89 and 0.93, respectively),
and 6-months (α’s = 0.94 and 0.92, respectively). Lastly, the
test–retest reliability of the Luck/Chance subscale [r(44) = 0.79,
p < 0.001] and Skill/Attitude subscale [r(44) = 0.75, p = 0.001]
from baseline to 1-month follow-up were both significant,
demonstrating strong stability over 1-month. At baseline to 6-
months, the test–retest reliability of the Luck/Chance subscale
[r(41) = 0.73, p < 0.001] and Skill/Attitude subscale [r(41) = 0.77,
p < 0.001] were significant, demonstrating strong stability over
6-months.
Gambling Problems
Luck/Chance distortions were positively related to gambling
problems at all timepoints (baseline, 1-month, and 6-months; see
Table 3, left column) and these relations were medium (baseline
and 6-months) and large (1-month) in magnitude.3 Cognitive
distortions regarding Skill/Attitude were unrelated to gambling
problems at all three timepoints.
Steiger’s Z-tests showed the correlation between Luck/Chance
distortions and gambling problems was stronger than the
correlation between Skill/Attitude distortions and gambling
problems at baseline (z = 3.02, p = 0.002), 1-month (z = 3.33,
p < 0.001), and 6-months (z = 2.22, p = 0.026). All effect sizes of
these correlational differences were medium in magnitude.
Gambling Behavior
Days Spent Gambling
Baseline endorsement of Luck/Chance distortions were not
concurrently related to days spent gambling at baseline nor
were they prospectively associated with days spent gambling
at 1-month (see Table 3, middle column). However, baseline
Luck/Chance scores were positively related to days spent
gambling at 6-months, and this effect size was moderate in
magnitude. Skill/Attitude distortions were positively related to
days spent gambling at all timepoints, being significantly related
at baseline and 6-months and marginally related at 1-month. The
effect sizes of these correlations were small at both baseline and
1-month but moderate at 6-months.
Steiger’s Z-tests showed that the correlation between baseline
Skill/Attitude distortions and days spent gambling was no
stronger than the correlation between baseline Skill/Attitude
distortions and gambling problems at baseline (z = −1.30,
p = 0.195), 1-month (z = −0.81, p = 0.419), or 6-months
(z = −1.19, p = 0.236). Moreover, the correlation between
baseline Skill/Attitude distortions and days spent gambling was
no stronger than the correlation between baseline Luck/Chance
distortions and days spent gambling at baseline (z = −1.40,
p = 0.16), 1-month (z = −1.18, p = 0.24), or 6-months
(z = −0.25, p = 0.81). However, the correlation between baseline
3Given violations of assumptions of normality, Spearman’s rank correlations
were also performed for each variable at all timepoints. The pattern of findings
were similar to those reported using Pearson correlations where Luck/Chance
distortions were related to problems both concurrently and prospectively while
distortions related to Skill/Attitude were related to behaviors both concurrently
and prospectively, yet not problems.
TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations, and ranges of Luck/Chance and Skill/Attitude Gambling Cognitions Inventory (GCI) subscales and outcome measures of
gambling severity (PGSI) and behavior (G-TLFB) at baseline (T1), 1-month (T2), and 6-months (T3).
T1 T2 T3
M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range
Variable Possible Actual Actual Actual
PGSI 3.12 2.83 0 – 27 0 – 11 2.89 2.46 0 – 10 2.76 2.82 0 – 12
G-TLFB
Days 9.00 6.46 0 – 31 0 – 31 9.61 8.91 0 – 31 6.66 6.91 0 – 31
Time (min) 1,260.17 1,211.86 – 0 – 5,768 1,425.13 1,802.21 0 – 9,563 1,051.44 1,271.32 0 – 6,195
GCI
Luck/Chance 0.15 0.15 0 – 1 0 – 0.57 0.23 0.21 0 – 0.71 0.21 0.20 0 – 0.81
Skill/Attitude 0.44 0.20 0 – 1 0 – 0.75 0.50 0.18 0 – 0.77 0.47 0.23 0 – 0.96
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Luck/Chance and 1-month gambling problems was stronger than
the correlation of baseline Luck/Chance with 1-month days spent
gambling (z = 2.10, p = 0.035; compare Table 3, left and middle
columns) and the effect size of this correlational difference was
medium in magnitude.
Because baseline Luck/Chance distortions were related to both
gambling problems and gambling behavior (days spent gambling)
at 6-months, we also conducted post hoc partial correlations
to examine possible unique relations of this form of distortion
with gambling problems. Post hoc partial correlations revealed,
when controlling for days spent gambling at 6-months, baseline
Luck/Chance distortions continued to be positively related to
6-month PGSI scores (rab.c = 0.39, p = 0.006). However, the
relationship between baseline Luck/Chance distortions and days
spent gambling at 6-months was no longer significant when
PGSI scores at 6-months were controlled in a post hoc partial
correlation (rab.c = 0.22, p = 0.084).
Time Spent Gambling
Baseline Luck/Chance distortions were not related to time
spent gambling at any timepoint (see Table 3, right column).
Baseline Skill/Attitude distortions were concurrently, positively,
related to time spent gambling at baseline and marginally,
positively, related to time spent gambling at 6-months. These
correlations were moderate and small in magnitude, respectively.
Skill/Attitude distortions were not related to time spent gambling
at 1-month.
Steiger’s Z-tests showed the correlation between baseline
Skill/Attitude distortions and time spent gambling was no
stronger than the correlation between baseline Skill/Attitude
distortions and gambling problems at baseline (z = −1.67,
p = 0.095), 1-month (z = −0.54, p = 0.593), or 6-months
(z = −0.64, p = 0.521). Moreover, the correlation between
baseline Skill/Attitude distortions and time spent gambling was
no stronger than the correlation between baseline Luck/Chance
distortions and time spent gambling at baseline (z = −1.08,
p = 0.28), 1-month (z = −0.72, p = 0.47), or 6-months
(z = −0.42, p = 0.68). However, the correlation between baseline
Luck/Chance and 1-month gambling problems was stronger than
the correlation of baseline Luck/Chance with 1-month time spent
gambling (z = 2.16, p = 0.03; compare Table 3, left and right
columns) and the effect size of this difference was medium in
magnitude.
Summary
Luck/Chance distortions were more strongly related to problems
than to behaviors, with the differences in strength being medium
in magnitude. Luck/Chance was also more strongly related to
problems than was Skill/Attitude, with the effect size of this
difference being medium in magnitude. Although Skill/Attitude
distortions were related to gambling behaviors but not to
gambling problems, skill distortions were not more strongly
related to behaviors than they were to problems. Further,
there was no evidence to suggest that Skill/Attitude distortions
were more strongly related to gambling behaviors than were
Luck/Chance distortions.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the validity of the GCI as a
measure of cognitive distortions in a sample of Dutch gamblers.
Moreover, it investigated the concurrent and prospective
relationship of the GCI to gambling problems and behaviors at
baseline and over 1-month and 6-months. The findings provide
initial support for the cross-cultural validity of the measure
in tapping aspects of gambling-related cognitive distortions
that show important relationships to gambling outcomes. In a
sample of Dutch gamblers, as baseline Luck/Chance distortions
increased, so did concurrent gambling-related problems. Having
greater cognitive distortions related to one’s own luck were
also associated with greater gambling-related problems 1- and
6-months later. These baseline Luck/Chance distortions were
found to be uniquely associated with gambling-problems. While
baseline luck distortions were also associated with a greater
number of days spent gambling at the 6-month follow-up, this
relation did not persist when 6-month gambling problems were
TABLE 3 | Pearson Product Moment Correlations between the Luck/Chance and Skill/Attitude Gambling Cognitions Inventory (GCI) Subscales at baseline (T1) with
outcome measures of gambling severity (PGSI) and behavior (G-TLFB) at baseline (T1), 1-month (T2), and 6-months (T3).
Outcome Variable
T1 GCI Subscales PGSI G-TLFB
Outcome wave Days Time
Luck/Chance
T1 outcome r(49) = 0.43, p = 0.001∗∗ r(48) = 0.10, p = 0.247 r(47) = 0.21, p = 0.076
T2 outcome r(46) = 0.51, p < 0.001∗∗∗ r(46) = 0.08, p = 0.310 r(46) = 0.08, p = 0.308
T3 outcome r(41) = 0.44, p = 0.002∗∗ r(41) = 0.31, p = 0.025∗ r(41) = 0.18, p = 0.126
Skill/Attitude
T1 outcome r(49) = 0.03, p = 0.426 r(48) = 0.29, p = 0.023∗ r(47) = 0.36, p = 0.007∗
T2 outcome r(46) = 0.06, p = 0.338 r(46) = 0.24, p = 0.053† r(46) = 0.18, p = 0.118
T3 outcome r(41) = 0.12, p = 0.229 r(41) = 0.34, p = 0.014∗ r(41) = 0.25, p = 0.062†
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. †Marginally significant. All one-tailed tests.
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controlled. In contrast, higher levels of baseline Skill/Attitude
distortions were concurrently associated with a greater number
of days spent gambling and increased time spent gambling.
Believing one has greater gambling-related skill at baseline was
significantly associated with greater days spent gambling at the
6-month follow up. Moreover, baseline skill beliefs were also
marginally associated with days spent gambling at the 1-month
follow-up, and with greater time spent gambling at the 6-month
follow-up.
Our findings partially provide a cross-cultural replication
of the GCI as being related to gambling problems in Dutch
gamblers. Our observed relationship of Luck/Chance distortions
to gambling problems is consistent with previous literature with
Canadian gamblers, where increased Luck/Chance distortions
were related to increased severity of gambling problems (McInnes
et al., 2014). Similar to the present study, these effects were
of moderate strength (McInnes et al., 2014). This finding also
fits with the broader literature using other cognitive distortion
measures that suggest a greater endorsement of gambling-
related false beliefs is associated with a greater severity of
gambling-related problems (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2014).
Thus, we can conclude this aspect of McInnes et al.’s (2014)
findings with Canadian gamblers appears to be generalizable
to Dutch gamblers. However, we did not replicate McInnes
et al.’s (2014) findings that Skill/Attitude distortions were
concurrently associated with severity of gambling problems. In
fact, in our Dutch sample, the relation between Luck/Chance
distortions and gambling problems was significantly stronger
than the relation between Skill/Attitude distortions and gambling
problems – a difference of moderate magnitude. Moreover,
the relationship between baseline Luck/Chance distortions and
gambling problems at 6-months persisted even after controlling
for days spent gambling at 6-months, suggesting these distortions
are uniquely related to future gambling problems even after
controlling for gambling behavior. These findings call for further
research to determine what may underlie the relationship
between gambling problems and distortions related to luck and
how these distortions might put people at risk for gambling
problems over-and-above putting them at risk for excessive
gambling behaviors.
One possible reason why Luck/Chance distortions, but not
Skill/Attitude distortions, were related to current and future
gambling problems in the present study of Dutch gamblers
pertains to the nature of our Dutch sample. While the entire
sample of Canadian gamblers in McInnes et al. (2014) consisted
of problem and disordered gamblers, the present Dutch study
included non-problem as well as problem gamblers. Overall, the
average severity of gambling problems in our sample was in
the moderate risk range (mean PGSI score of approximately 3).
It is possible that relations of Skill/Attitude distortions to
gambling problems may only emerge at relatively higher levels
of gambling problems, and perhaps the level of problems was
not sufficiently high in our sample to reveal relations with
Skill/Attitude distortions.
The present study extended the results found by McInnes
et al. (2014) by examining the relations of GCI subscale
scores to gambling behaviors – an outcome not previously
examined in relation to GCI scores in any cultural group. The
findings of the present study fit with the results of Joukhador
et al. (2004) using an alternate measure of gambling-related
cognitive distortions whereby among a sample of machine
gamblers, those with greater gambling-related cognitive
distortions spent more time gambling and participated in
more gambling sessions each week compared to those with
fewer cognitive distortions. While we found Skill/Attitude
distortions were related to gambling behaviors and generally
not to gambling problems, the correlation differences of
Skill/Attitude distortions with gambling behaviors as the
outcome were not significantly greater than the correlation
of Skill/Attitude distortions with gambling problems. Nor
were the correlations between Skill/Attitude distortions with
gambling behaviors significantly greater than the correlation
of Luck/Chance distortions with gambling behaviors. This
may have been due to the small sample size and associated
weak power to detect such correlational differences in
the present study, as discussed further in the limitations
section. While admittedly a less robust finding than the
unique and moderate sized relationship of luck distortions
to gambling problems, our correlational findings provide
modest support for a relationship between skill distortions
and increased gambling behaviors, a relationship not found
for luck distortions. Baseline Luck/Chance distortions were
unrelated to either gambling behavior at baseline or 1-month
follow-up in our Dutch sample of gamblers. While baseline
Luck/Chance distortions were related to days spent gambling
at 6-months, post hoc analyses revealed this effect did not
persist when gambling problems at 6-months were statistically
controlled.
One possible reason why Skill/Attitude distortions, as opposed
to Luck/Chance distortions, were predominantly related to
gambling behaviors but not to gambling problems in our
study pertains to the types of games favored by our sample
of Dutch gamblers. It has been suggested that games of
skill bring about persistent gambling behavior compared to
games of luck (Dickerson, 1993). In fact, increasing an
individual’s perceived skill over a game has been shown to
result in greater gambling behavior (Langer, 1975). Myrseth
et al. (2010) found that gamblers who solely preferred games
of skill evidenced greater illusion of control (similar to
Skill/Attitude cognitive distortions) compared to those who
solely preferred games of chance. Perhaps those who engage
in more games of skill believe they have greater control
over the game and thus perceive they have greater control
over their gambling, resulting in greater gambling behavior.
The Dutch gamblers in the present study were community-
recruited through online websites, posters, and gambling forums.
Particularly on gambling forums, gamblers discuss certain
strategies or perceived skill related to gambling which may
have caused a selection bias, resulting in the recruitment
of those who predominantly played skill-based games. In
support of this possibility, frequent playing of skill games (e.g.,
playing cards) once a week or more was much more common
than frequent playing of chance games (e.g., playing slots)
among the present study’s gamblers (98% vs 14%, respectively).
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However, it is important to emphasize that this explanation is
speculative.
While it is plausible certain methodological and sampling
differences may have brought about the differences between
our study and the findings of McInnes et al. (2014), the
divergences may be the result of a true cross-cultural difference
in cognitive distortions and/or gambling practices. Unlike
McInnes et al. (2014) Canadian study, we did not observe a
relationship between Skill/Attitude distortions and problems in
our Dutch sample. This does not indicate the GCI Skill/Attitude
scale is an invalid measure of cognitive distortions in Dutch
gamblers, as Skill/Attitude belief scores were related to gambling
behaviors. Rather, it is possible that differences in gambling
practices and policies ascribed by different cultures resulted
in inherently different gamblers in Netherlands than those in
Canada (Raylu and Oei, 2004b; Papineau, 2005; Oei et al., 2008).
Perhaps distorted beliefs about skill are more important for
the development and maintenance of gambling-related problems
in Canadian as opposed to Dutch gamblers due to certain
cultural or structural differences. For example, according to
Hofstede’s (2001) cultural ratings (see also Hofstede et al.,
2010), Canada is a substantially more masculine culture (i.e.,
emphasis on ambition and accumulation of wealth) than
Netherlands (i.e., relative masculinity scores of 52 vs. 14).
It is possible that an individual with high levels of skill
distortions might be more likely to develop problems with
gambling in a culture that places relatively more emphasis
on material wealth and winning (i.e., in a more ‘masculine’
culture).
Limitations
Unexpectedly, only male gamblers were recruited and thus,
we are unable to generalize our findings to Dutch female
gamblers. While gambling is more common in men than
women (Welte et al., 2002), we were neither expecting nor
intending to recruit only men into the present study. Previous
empirical literature has found numerous differences in gambling
practices between males and females. For example, males
tend to prefer games requiring skill (e.g., sports betting or
cards) while females tend to prefer playing games of luck or
chance where no such skill is involved (e.g., slot machines;
Toneatto et al., 1997). Indeed, skill-based games were the games
predominantly played by participants in our study. Thus, we
may have had insufficient variability in Skill/Attitude distortions
to see any relation with gambling-related problems. However,
this seems unlikely given there was sufficient variability in
Skill/Attitude distortions to see relations with gambling behavior.
Future research should be sure to recruit an equal distribution
of male and female gamblers to allow for between-gender
comparisons on different types of gambling-related cognitive
distortions.
As alluded to earlier, a possible limitation concerns the
relatively small sample size and the consequent impact on
power. A post hoc power analysis showed that to obtain power
of 0.8 for a moderate effect size of r = 0.30, 67 participants
would have been needed. Thus, with a sample size of 49
participants, the present study was adequately powered to
detect large effects but underpowered to detect small effects.
Attrition and unmet inclusion criteria further contributed
to power issues for detecting statistically significant relations
of skill distortions and gambling behaviors at the follow-
ups, or for demonstrating significantly stronger correlations
of skill distortions with gambling behavior relative to other
correlations. Nonetheless, we did detect one significant effect
and two marginal trends that are suggestive of the utility of
Skill/Attitude distortions in understanding prospective gambling
behaviors. Moreover, due to the relatively small sample size in
the present study, we were unable to perform Exploratory or
Confirmatory Factor Analyses on the GCI and thus unable to
fully demonstrate cross-cultural validity of this scale. However,
the Cronbach’s alphas for the GCI in the present study
indicate good internal consistency of the subscales based on
the factorial structure of the GCI reported by McInnes et al.
(2014). While the two-factor structure of the GCI has been
previously established by McInnes et al. (2014), the validity
of this distinct two-factor structure in other cultures has yet
to be been demonstrated. Thus, a larger study is necessary
to confirm the cross-cultural validity of the GCI’s factor
structure. Further, a larger sample size would permit the
use of multiple regression analyses controlling for baseline
levels of the outcomes to establish whether GCI cognitive
distortions predict changes in gambling outcomes over time.
While our study suggests greater baseline cognitive distortions
are predictive of greater gambling problems and behaviors
over time, it could be that gambling behaviors are predictive
of escalations in cognitive distortions over time as opposed
to the reverse. However, temporal directionality consistent
with cognitive theory (Ladouceur and Walker, 1996) has
been previously established in a longitudinal study with a
sample of 1,000 Canadian gamblers. Specifically, Yakovenko
et al. (2016) found changes in cognitive distortions reliably
preceded and predicted increases in gambling behavior, and
that this path was stronger than the converse path from
gambling behavior to increased cognitive distortions over time.
Future longitudinal research should examine such temporality
in the Dutch population and with the GCI to determine
if Yakovenko et al.’s (2016) directional results are true
cross-culturally and for the distortions measured by the
GCI.
As the present study was performed online in the comfort of
the participants’ homes rather than in a controlled, laboratory
setting, we are unable to ensure participants completed each
component of the study as directed (e.g., alone without
distraction). However, the research team did not receive any
inquiries for clarification from any of the participants and at least
some of the McInnes et al. (2014) results were replicated in the
present sample, attesting to their validity.
Lastly, due to the differences between our sample and the
one studied in McInnes et al. (2014), the potential cross-cultural
differences highlighted in this paper should be interpreted with
caution. Future studies directly comparing gambler samples
with similar characteristics in Canada, Netherlands, and other
countries, will yield results that can be interpreted as cross-
cultural differences with higher confidence.
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CONCLUSION
Cognitive distortions have been known to play an important role
in creating and maintaining disordered gambling (Ladouceur
and Walker, 1996). In fact, they are such a fundamental
contributor to disordered gambling that they are often targeted
in gambling treatment (Ladouceur et al., 1998; Walker et al.,
2006; Fortune and Goodie, 2012). Targeting these cognitive
distortions in treatment has shown positive results in reducing
gambling behaviors and problems (Walker et al., 2006; Fortune
and Goodie, 2012). The results of our study suggest there are
distinct cognitive correlates that may be associated with certain
aspects of disordered gambling, at least in Dutch gamblers.
Dutch gamblers who endorse greater Luck/Chance distortions
may not gamble more frequently or spend greater amounts of
time gambling overall, yet when they do gamble they may engage
in more risky gambling as a function of their belief in luck. Dutch
gamblers who believe they have greater gambling skill may wager
more frequently and spend more time gambling yet this may
not necessarily be associated with developing gambling-related
problems. Beyond excessive gambling involvement, how and why
an individual engages in gambling activities may be an important
contributor to developing and/or maintaining excessive or
problem gambling (Stewart and Zack, 2008). Moreover, cultural
differences may further contribute to disordered gambling by
influencing the types of erroneous beliefs gamblers hold. While
beliefs in luck and skill both contribute to gambling problems in
Canadian gamblers (McInnes et al., 2014), Dutch gamblers do not
show the same relation of skill distortions to gambling problems.
In Dutch gamblers, beliefs about skill may be more important
for contributing to excessive gambling behaviors while beliefs
about luck may have a greater influence on developing gambling
problems. Importantly, in conceptualizing and understanding
cognitive distortions as being composed of two distinct yet
overlapping dimensions (i.e., Luck/Chance and Skill/Attitude)
each of which have distinct gambling outcome correlates (i.e.,
gambling problems and behaviors, respectively), we might
further our understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of
excessive and problem gambling.
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